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The Louisiana Supreme Court has frequently announced that
it will permit no derogation from either the letter or the spirit
of the civil service laws, the objective of which is "to secure...
(public career employees] in a permanent status of Civil Service
position." So, in Young v. Charity Hospital of Louisiana at
New Orleans,1 a dismissal attempt which was defective for lack
of proper written notice could not be rendered effective to start
the time limitation on appeals by curative steps later taken.
"Nullities" established in the interest of individuals might be
susceptible of ratification but not "nullities" in derogation of
public order and good morals; the latter are absolute and void
ab initio.2 In two cases3 reaching the court during the last term,
this principle was given a curious new twist by an imaginative
Civil Service Commission. It refused to dismiss an appeal, al-
though not timely filed, because the statute under which manda-
tory retirements were effected was alleged to be unconstitu-
tional; the statute providing for mandatory retirement for em-
ployees reaching the age of sixty-five and insured under federal
social security law was said to exceed constitutional power by
adding as a new cause for mandatory removal a cause which
did not exist under well defined judicial meaning.
Pretermitting the intriguing inquiry into this inversion of
judicial and legislative power, the court held that its statement
in Young had to do with attempts to cure procedural defects
and since there were none here, the limitation on appeals would
run.4 However anxious an administrative tribunal might be to
reach a constitutional issue, it could not nullify safeguards
designed to insure prompt litigation of issues by holding that
the mere allegation of a constitutional issue freed the allegor
from the restraints of prescription in pursuing his remedy. 5
*Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
1. 226 La. 708, 77 So.2d 13 (1954).
2. Id. at 714, 77 So.2d at 15.
3. Chadwick v. Department of Highways, 238 La. 661, 116 So.2d 286 (1959)
Purdy v. Department of Revenue, 238 La. 673, 116 So.2d 290 (1959).




The case of Department of Institutions v. Day,6 decided with
the Young case in 1954, was also deemed inapplicable; it was
ruled unnecessary, in connection with a mandatory separation
from service, for an employing department to acknowledge a
statement from an employee being separated since such a state-
ment is not a voluntary resignation such as required acceptance
in Day in order to start prescription running on an appeal to
the Civil Service Commission.' Prescription here began to run
from the date of separation from the service specified in the
notice of mandatory removal.
Fallon v. New Orleans Police Department" presented, among
other points, an interesting argument based on Slochower v.
Board of Higher Education of New York City." A dismissal
after full hearing based on refusal to answer questions in a prior
bribery investigation was urged as a denial of due process of law
and an abridgement of the privileges and immunities of a citizen
of the United States. But Slochower did not hold unconstitu-
tional the drawing of inferences from failure to answer ques-
tions as such; it held unconstitutional summary dismissal from
a state job solely because of failure to answer questions before
a federal committee. 10 In Fallon, there was apparently full op-
portunity for the dismissed officer to explain his failure to
answer, and the questions refused were in any event intimately
related to the work of the officer."' Slochower was deemed by
the court not "apposite." Other grounds urged were also re-
jected and the rulings of the city Civil Service Commission af-
firmed.
In Hearty v. Department of Police, City of New Orleans,12
the city Civil Service Commission made another attempt to re-
capture discretion to attach terms and conditions to its orders
of reinstatement, but the attempt was again turned back and
adherence affirmed to the line of jurisprudence begun with
Boucher v. Heard; 3 in the event of an unlawful dismissal, no
order of reinstatement from the Commission is required and
6. 228 La. 105, 81 So.2d 826 (1955). Both the Young and Day cases are
commented on in The Work of the Louisiana Supreme Court for the 1954-1955
Term-Administrative Law, 16 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW 282-85 (1956).
7. 228 La. 105, 110-12, 81 So.2d 826, 828 (1955).
8. 238 La. 531, 115 So.2d 844 (1959).
9. 350 U.S. 551 (1956).
10. Id. at 558-59.
11. 238 La. 531, 546-47, 115 So.2d 844, 849-50 (1959).
12. 238 La. 956, 117 So.2d 71 (1960).
13. 228 La. 1078, 84 So.2d 827 (1956).
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hence no terms and conditions, such as denying back pay or
offsetting wages earned elsewhere against such back pay, may
be attached by the Commission. As has been noted,'4 handing
down findings of fact and conclusions of law by the Commission
that a dismissal is illegal are to suffice as authority for restora-
tion to a departmental payroll. In Hearty, a dismissal had been
based on the fact of indictment by a federal grand jury for
making false statements without "any inquiry as to the 'reason-
ableness, truth or weight of the accusation' "; this was not
deemed to constitute legal suspension after hearing and upon a
finding of illegality by the Commission, "' [the employee] became
entitled as a matter of course and without an order of the Com-
mission to receive his regular salary.'"15 (Emphasis added.)
One may now speculate whether, assuming such a charge was
not sustained after hearing, a commission order could be accom-
panied by terms and conditions or whether it too would now
be a case in which "the exaction of the law has not been fully
observed" and hence civil service status "never legally suspended
or terminated." The emasculation of administrative discretion
to attach terms and conditions, a discretion seemingly provided
in the Constitution, would then be practically complete.16
In State ex rel. McAvoy v. Louisiana State Board of Medical
Examiners, 7 the court reaffirmed its position that "there is no
natural or absolute right to practice medicine or surgery" in
Louisiana. 8 Consequently, the applicant was held "not entitled
to a contradictory hearing before the Board."
Actually, the hearing afforded the applicant comes within
the requisites of fair procedure deemed necessary by the United
States Supreme Court in denying a professional license; in Gold-
smith v. United States Board of Tax Appeals, 9 the Court di-
rected that an applicant "should not have been rejected upon
charges of his unfitness without giving him an opportunity by
notice for hearing and answer.
20
Here, the applicant furnished the Board with references as
14. The Work of the Louisiana Supreme Court for the 1958-1959 Term -
Administrative Law, 20 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW 268, 270 (1960).
15. 238 La. 956, 961, 117 So.2d 71, 73 (1960).
16. See Justice McCaleb dissenting in Hermann v. New Orleans Police De-
partment, 238 La. 81, 104, 113 So.2d 612, 620 (1959).
17. 238 La. 502, 115 So.2d 833 (1959).
18. Id. at 529, 115 So.2d at 843.
19. 270 U.S. 117 (1926).
20. Id. at 123.
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to good character but prior to a Board meeting at which the
application and references were to be considered, the Board
Secretary was prompted to make further inquiry. Thereafter,
at the hearing, applicant was apparently afforded full oppor-
tunity to explain derogatory information which came to the
Board but failed to explain it satisfactorily; the Board concluded
"it was not satisfied that relatrix was of good moral character"
and denied a license.
The court limited its review to determining "whether the
Board abused its discretion in refusing the application ... and
whether or not it deprived her of due process of law by con-
ducting the hearing . . . improperly and illegally."'21 Having
considered the record, the court found the Board had not abused
its discretion in concluding as it did. While indicating that "the
holder of a license has a property right which cannot be cur-
tailed or revoked, save for causes prescribed by law . . . on
charges formally made and heard contradictorily," the court
concluded that "an applicant for a license is not entitled to a
hearing before the Board. ' 22 (Emphasis added.) Rather than
thus relying so greatly upon judicial review as a check upon
administratrive arbitrariness, the court might have affirmed
the hearing afforded as satisfying fair procedure; in Perpente
v. Moss, 23 an opinion often approvingly cited, a New York court
has said that "a license may not be refused on the ground that
the applicant 'is not a person of good character' unless the ap-
plicant has fair opportunity to meet a challenge to his good
character and unless the court of review is apprised of the basis




The "Gas Sign Ordinance," which appears to have been
spreading like a rash throughout the municipalities of the coun-
try in the last few years, was held unconstitutional in two cases
21. 238 La. 502, 510, 115 So.2d 833, 836 (1959).
22. Id. at 530, 115 So.2d at 844.
23. 293 N.Y. 325, 56 N.E.2d 726 (1944).
24. Id. at 329, 56 N.E.2d at 727.
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